

Q. Les' last talk w/this: we had discussed "Les's" views,
and agreed: though (1) my interp. was different (it still is)
and (2) he thought we were splitting territory.

DE-LG: 1. Same body of data: though --

40-50

67-69

negot

2. This data establishes (I am now aware of this
than LG: all know more)

when does Les think

he got ideas?

(Why did he read my '61 memos?)

Has he looked

again at '61, Note 1, etc.?

DE - ⁵⁰⁻1961, 64-65 - first saw for those years

LG probably first saw as general rules

presum - can't be missed

pers - opt cycle - " " "

Domino theory, crisis: " " "

Pres - "middle line: " " "

- "avoid losing, buying time: " " "

(But paradox: Pres puts "essential" items:

CG does miss ^{this} for '61!)

TROOPS!

Exp: We agree on Hypo 1 -

this follows from Studies

(I first noted, LG first?

generalized? - engage can confirm) - -

but differ on explanation.

3. Different Hypo are possible about reasons
for these: Ours are different (though
superficially similar).

In fact, mine may be overstated: at least,
Les's should be rational more and related

(and, I think, some accommodation would).

Yet I prefer mine, as approp.

4. Mine are all stated for the 1961 Cam in that

study: except for Fall of China (I emphasized

recent events being on politics: emphasized

strategic matters much more. (Didn't get so suspicious

of these till I saw other cases; also, I "mirrored" my

own 1964-65 experience). So: I was closer than

Les's statement - [i.e. vice versa.]

See also: Note #1; OPP (SA lecture);

talks to CFR, Stanis, Pearson, (SCADAG)

Tanin, Komer...

5. Imagine LG had received my paper before drafting his:

(1) ~~Q~~ What should he have done?

(2) Call? + expected to see shortly.

(4) Said: Oh shit - I did that. And then... ^{Peterman}

(3) fn. I thought I had... the method.

Conscious reason: don't argue. Talk with my use of sources.

In fact, disagree; show independence.

Unconscious? Underpinnings?

(4) I did not worry that his would accuse me: no sense of urgency. 'or others

I didn't foresee effects of:

(1) his not coming to LA.

(2) lack of "gracious" fn

(3) negative fns.

(5) I would have: called; expressed as conjectures, asked for explanation;

fn style: my thesis. Sorenson - in Comp

11 footnotes: I don't use 7 (2-4 I wish I had)

quote 2 (he only cites)

give 1 in longer form

give LG credit for 1

[LG does not quote: - Schles, 80s, files on troops: or mention! } us.
 - Argon on Fall of China, 1950! } talk
 - Schles on "quicksand" } there

LG

On "Sorenson":

49 / 39 didn't use (should have!)

51 31

used in longer form

fn 50p 29, not used (differs thesis!)

55 32

didn't use (used different quote, see passage, which LG omits!)

52: I ^{quote} ~~say~~, he doesn't.

LG 32fn.

cited, with attribution (misquoting!) but to disagree with "Schles";

53: not used

54: we disagree.

32 56: not used: should have!

57: not used. (could have)

58: I quote, LG doesn't.

59: I don't use (could have).

6. What to do:

des to publish
in Panter book!

1. Redraft Send out no more.
2. Redraft, send new version.
3. (des to publish first?) [Not really necessary; we agree enough.]
4. Deal with des' hyps directly? (Watch it: I disagree)
("Discussed over years: we agree on much in it we learned much when we disagreed, it shows data isn't conclusive, so his attributions must be kept in mind.")
[He could say the same!]

5. Priority: DE for 1961 (+1964-65?)
1950-NIES

6. Apology by des
WHO said otherwise?

Issues remaining:

Use of studies : + classified

Ref to studies : + each other

Sharing topics

Joint work :

- Stipulations : unambiguous patterns
- Competitions : evidence, argument & disagreement

Ed question
CG practice, later

7. des' priority? (a) Generalization (from studies).

(b) Emphasis on continuity of
US internally-stated aims.

(I question whether this

covers hyp 1 - that Pres

took them as seriously. But it

is a sufficient hyp. for much

phenomena: contradicts P.S.

notion that "optimism was

necessary to explain our actions":

(must) they could be explained as gambles

for high stakes. But whose?

What stakes? To assume

"national interest" coming is to confront

paradox, why not educate public? Why hold back
on escalation?

see D-

NOTE

Or was this part of Pres' reason
(more than I say), used as whole
internal rationale?

Also: in 1961 it was exacerbated
by Pres' own actions.

DE - Galle

Some body of data (shared w/ by MH, RM?)
w/ deep knowledge repeating of:

DE

1. 1961 (US)
2. 1964-65 (US)
3. 1965-67 (VN)

LG

1. 1940-50 (US)
2. 1967-69 (US)
3. Negot

Agree: first 3 p. page 2; and the, rejection of
quickened. (see P 41, p. 3)

But LG's ^(see A2, p. 5) types — as interpretations, explanation of above
"data" as alternative to mine — worth considering
(now then & coming) but, I think, less satisfactory
[Ib] don't address, or explain:

(1) 1961

(2) generally, great pressure for + against doing more.

(3) disruption: about air, prospects

(4) great reliance on allies, low leverage ^{(no ability to substitute w/}

(5) causal effects of Phase A decisions on Phase B outcome.

(6) great emphasis — ^{on S-T} — willowens to pay, to give up
L-T prospects — to buy time

("Security interests" don't usually put great
value on "buying time" — ^{~ small amount} though sometimes they
do, as in '61! But not? 1964-65; 1969;
1950 (except, last half?); 1953-55

Show critical
risk!

S-T vs. L-T

p. 31 WOW! Totally suppresses press for troops!
WHY? See p 33! (Despite fact!)
(Contradicts Hyp. 2; and adigning
of Hyp. 1)

b.32: dismisses O'Donnell

[I have not yet counted on
What could JFK have done, in '64? (Buckham)
e.g. RFK counts; logic; O'Donnell;

differs between Presidents; contribution of JFK, LBJ

Look at each year since 1950. Character.

"J" can't take a '54 defeat today.

How did she "get away with it"? Why did he?

What if ---

[Read: Salinger, Adams, she

b.34

No notion of Pres deception [Why hide pressing,
if status is strategically ^{Hyp!} important; this does
not contribute to "educating" public; or is that regarded
as hopeless? Why talk of "the fight"?]

No explanation why Phase B follows A.

Dillo

29 Sept 70

Dillo seems to
affirm: though not
a "net"
(wrong method)

p. 1 Distinction: Pragmatist (in quicksand), ideologue

quote: If he could have seen...

quote: "who look at where we are..."

[Does G characterize ideological on right? Or its
meaning?]

p. 2 quote P1 "thy" is Presidents?

quote P2

but DE argue

Last TP: argue

p. 3 quote

argue with last TP: did Pres "believe" states?

[Should we argue in print about our differences?
Or hammer the point?]

[CG right will cite me: to confirm characterizations]

[Had I sent my paper to CG, and his were
written later: I would not have ~~then~~ used anything its
parallelism [I seem to have a stronger sense of how unequivocally
the series flows from the studies] but I would have been struck, perhaps, by
lack of reference.]

[Note: I expected audience to know from
both papers: no need to quote Dillo, except
when disagreeing]

[I did not inquire risk of G's fury, or suspicion.]
President, for failure
to cite?

[Alternatives: (1) show territory
(2) confirm
(3) work jointly]

p. 4 "at last..."

Domestic seen as only one of 2 dimensions, not stronger

[Why do I downplay? ^{Ball...} NIE's...?]

[^{perception of} Dependence of "foreign states" on unacknowledged

American-pol states. WBundy, McN...

Do JCS "believe"? Does Pres?

on p. 23

p. 5: Rather, discuss DPP.

(vs. LG's discussion of "vital")

^{by LG}
Domestic underplayed: see bottom p. 5, top p. 6

p. 6 quote LG: assumptions not explicated (Whiting)

[evidence they were not "real," but
necessary or surrogates?]

p. 7 Argue with Hyp 2, "brakemen".

(like my - or Wolf's - counter-hyp to my

no. 25-26

interpretation of 1961.

But cite Helt: factor of disbelief that big jobs
would work.

[Aguments = areas of unequivocal evidence

Disaguments, different emphasis: areas of conjecture

[LG's interpretation always deserves consideration]

p. 8: My account is better: distinguishing S-R, L-R, &

"sensitive instruments"

[Note: Many points in LG paper I could have
used (and mentioned) if willing to cite now!
What I stated was what I had thought of. —

p. 11-13 NO — on denial of inside knowledge (Discredit,
misleading)
(cite: DE, Whiting...)

see p. 23

p. 11: I dispute "high objectives as the main driving
force toward further involvement": at best, consider
it as one of three 'good' hyps:
Push — Pull

[Agree: Pres felt it important, had eyes open, etc.
— but only important?]

same statements of his "believed"? How "confirm" this?

[The Law explains Rule 2; + meaning?

Must at least invoke disruption of public
disbelief]

p. 12 — This is like Wolf center hyp

p. 12 I disagree with "Pres as brackman" as explanation

of only involvement was gradual [Rule 2 is politically
based, and urgent, compelling] [Not just that Pres thought he had little
to lose by delaying, very partially...]

see 25-26

[One can characterize data with by

(1) strategic description, or

(2) describing 1 or more hyps compatible with it.]

p. 16: ⁻¹⁸ I disagree with "Korean War" as turning-point:

downplays Fall of China. (p. 17)

+ downplays domestic politics 18

p. 20 G omits effect of Korea on Rule 2 (not on Rule 1)

Both treated
by '61, troops!

Hyp 1 - right description of Pres action, questionable on
Hyp 2 - vague/misleading on description (interpretation of belief, noting),
questionable (& doubt) on noting.

[LG agrees on Hyps as descriptions?

but his interpretations are different:

For LG: Rule 1: loss of VN is very bad for the US

Rule 2: ^{not worth it, probably wait till next} No need to do more than "minimally
necessary: postpone "extraneous"

[An alternative: Rule 1, above

Rule 2: since US public don't agree
(explain this: and failure to try to educate...)
avoid unnecessary (S-R) costs.]

p. 22: cite Johnson for OPP.

(and, fear of passivity.)

(LG downplays "anguish," trans of Rule 1-2)

p. 23: LG can't explain why

VN was "critical," but (2) it was French fight
and we couldn't use troops, etc.

[Part of Rule (2) or 3: do use allies as
much as possible, and determine, and describe it
as "their fight" (hedge against sudden failure)]

[Don't be responsible for losing: DE/VNM; Ball,
good doctor;]

pp 25-26: Dubious account of Geneva.

Concise use of Kellb:
part (4), p. 8

⑧

of a series of small steps, each making
it more difficult to reverse course, until
"at last".

now + now difficult to draw back, reverse course,

a gradual sinking, unnoted at first, till
it becomes difficult to extricate oneself; then,
efforts to extricate actually driving one in further

eventually,

original notions forgotten, overshadowed by the
new perception of the difficulty of going back, the
hope of attaining solid ground ahead promptly;

It was vents in Berlin, Cuba, Laos, etc. That made it
intolerable to lose VN in late '61: not vents in VN, 1964-61.

Phase B — Butler, 27

(26)

Sets out toward on.

Notion that ~~back~~ over the disorientations to extricate
was dominated by the note vents simulation
investing, the noting sharply as this increases (C.J. 1961-62,
1965-68), see pages 47, 39, 21, 31
1000 Days, 910 (Beller's efforts January 1962)

This, ~~is~~ limited escalation, helped only w.r.t. S-R ^(probably)

- (2) Assurance to allies + Congress of limits + adequacy;
~~then, often~~
- (3) assurance, often

B. Dynamic factors (guidance):

(1) VC/DRV motion: as predicted, worse than expected ^(by itself), esp. recently

(2) GVN: as predicted, worse than expected: non-Comm
tunnel (unforeseen) 1960, 1963, 1964, 1966

(3) Assurance, often, as limited measures, need for
ally, need for stability → as leverage, decreasing
- incentive for ally to change.

(4) Limited measures: VC/DRV can counter (our time: as
they probe could + would trigger measures, but we can study), +
prepare to: but reasonable, be low; prepare/recover...
→ Optimum (Phase B).

(5) Operational reporting & → Optimum. ^{new commander: (bigger effort, new effort, or just)}

(6) GVN "churn up," stabilizes.

(7) Optimum → less budget and announcements, operational
programs, less show of effort to get out → Costs rise.
(Important secondary effects: P.C.J. on JFK -
stakes increased, though already high, prob. sufficient)
(Also, costs of "foolishness.")

Expectation pattern:

Dynamic factors linked since assumed a recurrence
of crisis. ^{deliberate timing} and would "marginally more severe" But decision
would be same as last time. But the use of
air-ground in 1965 does not reflect a different air, values of CBS,
or effect of 1961-64 incident, or 1950-55 ^{as much as} ~~massive~~ ⁵⁻⁶ ~~needs~~.

Hypo: - JFK did not stay in because of "7-year limit"
(given some ⁰³ association), or, - '63, because of 61-62;

- Johnson, the, etc.

- CBS did not stay in ¹⁹⁶⁵ because of 1961-64, (or - 1968
because of 1965-68, though this not nearly true).

- Nixon not staying in because of 1961-69.

~~in that recent context~~

Reasons to avoid loss have always been enough to
do what we did do, - more of necessity

[Though not, perhaps, to get Johnson to send troops;
or the to build - send troops, without ---

..... Rising costs have stabilizing effect

There may have been limits to what a given Pres could do,
but they were generally higher than what he did do.

[Earlier hypo: Pres regards $\oint$ objection - holding VN -
as more important than, he thinks, public does:
like FDR before WWI; have need to limit
measures, but to stay a sum of limited measures off
little promise for L.S.

O'Donnell

(This year is always a bad year to
lose Vietnam to Communism.)

* Helms: "Chickens come home to roost."

DE: P.S. factors might have been sufficient, by
themselves, but in the event, weren't needed.

CBS didn't feel more "trapped" than Johnson
or the or JFK. Nor does Nixon.

What is to be explained.

- rather than getting out or doing more -

✓ 1. Choice of options of ^{unacceptable} cost & risk, despite predictions they would not be adequate to L-R, and despite recommendations ^{that} other options might be adequate if only if chosen in S-R. Why not now, or less?
P.S. answer is wrong

e.g. to LOWER COSTS

✓ 2. Rejection of moves said to be necessary in L-R, and must be started soon because of S-R risks (in US to VN).
[Political: underestimation of real ^{military} significance of S-R military]

✓ 3. This - from 1+2 - appropriate action "as if" totally concerned with S-R. (not with low COSTS, RISKS, or SUCCESS.)

P.S. answer - perhaps all be reversed - S-R - wrong.

✓ 4. Concealment of internal costs & risks from public; lies; false optimism; clandestinity.

[5. Real optimism following false optimism, crisis decisions

✓ 6. - Internal costs of very high stakes for US "strategically" of victory, state, civil (not intell). Why?

["Ignoring" intell costs of moderate stakes.]

→ Get assumption that troops, etc. are to be ruled out

(internal constraints?)

not worth that?

public doesn't think it worth it

✓ - Lots that domestic consequences of "loss" would be great.

✓ - action that increases political impact of loss

✓ - although chosen policies do not promise to avoid loss, except in S-R.

✓ despite:
✓ US threat - little threat
✓ that leads into pol.
✓ public: threat
✓ not will stand
✓ structural
✓ argument

Still
there?

✓ Escalating - Quickened
Escalating - the Perseus

Stress: Ambivalence leads to sequentially contradictory
action, rather than compromise action [or: compromise
(tension) followed by uncompromised (release)].

(as regarded internally; public told otherwise)
Sequential Decision, but the "test" ensures Phase B
option, so that the "essential" steps postponed,
are later seen as unnecessary, till "too late" to
implement. 'Refers' grand troops; big bombing; mobilization.
But means were inadequate, it turns out (though needs right
have been, too; or explosive.)
As if: S-r forces.

Constraints lead to increased

(1) Option

Phase B

} lack of full reform

(2) Lack of leverage.

(3) Increased commitment.

The lack of leverage means reforms regarded are not
(probably correctly, in retrospect) as essential ~~should~~
be achieved. The option means they cease to be
seen as essential - till the next crisis, in which
again they are postponed because of immediate needs.
The failure to address reform issues (which is over-
determined by other factors, including Com resistance) the
recurrence of crisis:

Paradox

Big States, Small Means

Big States: international States and a propaganda
for their domestic concerns: hence, unexamined,
unconsidered.

Small Means: actual clients (also also) demands
which will, competition, airpower: expense unnecessary.
cheap no-lose (as chance of win); maximizing of public:
cheap policy (because don't care).

i.e. even those who think goal is important will not
support grand troops, big expense.
→ L/E on adequacy of policy



Present: Pattern dissolves.

✓

Reject g.s.; but then what?

✓

Hand to tell about Pres.

✓

Hand to tell about Pres.

2.3. Hypo on relation of Pres views to estimates

Pattern: ① ignore sets

(of l-r; this pattern: ② ignore l-r)

✓ - ③ Big goals, little means.

✓ - ④ "accept bad goals," by leverage, fail, give up, left with no goals: "buying time"

✓ - ⑤ Lack of leverage

✓ - ⑥ Option follows

✓ - ⑦ New crisis after pre option

Still: Pres takes long shots: rather than go up or out.

What drives him? Why is failure intolerable?

(vs. failure never me)

Eliza: --

In 1950, accounts of hands & masters are recognizable; aggression...

- certain hypo eliminated: prior commitments, investments...

- fall of China (Yalta, ^{China} Gorko - coalition ally... ✓

McCarthy
- 1950 election
- Korea, MacArthur ✓

Hypo optimal Hyp: since then, roughly foregone.

1954, 1961, 1965... Schles...

But summary of decision. (Dominoes; unacceptable)

Hyp: Basic decision same reasons as - 1950

("This year is always a bad year to

lose SVN to Coms.") So: "buy time" (even if means that pre time big end). Postpone.

1950 model explain all these patterns (in

consistent) =

2
3

looks like ps. also, line on fire

Pattern 803

long shot needed; not too subtle

Other reasons for option: Phase 4, 5. Presigns first round

1961:
init take a 50%
not even possible
was, the
small, etc. election

Note 1

Dems: let China (Poland, Czechs) fall: can't lose Indos.

Repuln: let NK fall, ^(and, Hungary) NVN fall: can't lose SUN, as Offshore

VFK: Koss: can't lose SUN.

Nixon: SUN threatened: can't lose Cambodia.

Grab: : Asia - first 58

45

last part 34

Strategy: 27 126

Chap success 51

play on VK: 159, 160

164

more full out of context 47

China 87

88 good doctor non-passive

(so worried about concluding VC to be "agrarian reformers"
- rightly but terrorists...)

condition 108

last part - decline aid 114
110

sums 116

Nixon on Hiss 121 vs. Bayles 171 VP
227

Chap writing 212 189

